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DATA-INFORMED DUTIES IN AI DEVELOPMENT
Frank Pasquale *
Law should help direct—and not merely constrain—the development of artiﬁcial intelligence (AI). One path to inﬂuence is the development of standards of care both supplemented and informed by rigorous
regulatory guidance. Such standards are particularly important given
the potential for inaccurate and inappropriate data to contaminate machine learning. Firms relying on faulty data can be required to compensate those harmed by that data use—and should be subject to punitive
damages when such use is repeated or willful. Regulatory standards for
data collection, analysis, use, and stewardship can inform and complement generalist judges. Such regulation will not only provide guidance
to industry to help it avoid preventable accidents. It will also assist a
judiciary that is increasingly called upon to develop common law in response to legal disputes arising out of the deployment of AI.
INTRODUCTION
Corporations will increasingly attempt to substitute artiﬁcial intelligence (AI) and robotics for human labor.1 This evolution will create
novel situations for tort law to address. However, tort will only be one of
several types of law at play in the deployment of AI. Regulators will try to
forestall problems by developing licensing regimes and product standards. Corporate lawyers will attempt to deﬂect liability via contractual
arrangements.2 The interplay of tort, contract, and regulation will not
* Piper & Marbury Professor of Law, University of Maryland. I would like to thank
the Columbia Law Review staff for careful editing of the piece, as well as those commenting
on the piece at the Columbia Law Review Symposium “Common Law for the Age of AI”
(Colleen Chien and Olga Russakovsky). I also wish to thank attendees at the University of
Melbourne’s “Digital Citizen” conference and participants in a workshop at Data & Society
entitled “Algorithms on the Shop Floor.” I am particularly grateful to Taylor M. Cruz,
Madeleine Elish, and Emanuel Moss for their comments at the Data & Society Workshop.
Colleagues at the University of Maryland have also been generous with their time and
expertise. Responsibility for errors or omissions, of course, rests with me.
1. See, e.g., James Manyika, Susan Lund, Michael Chui, Jacques Bughin, Jonathan
Woetzel, Parul Batra, Ryan Ko & Saurabh Sanghvi, McKinsey & Co., Jobs Lost, Jobs
Gained: What the Future of Work Will Mean for Jobs, Skills, and Wages 1 (2017), https://
www.mckinsey.com/~/media/McKinsey/Featured%20Insights/Future%20of%20Organizations
/What%20the%20future%20of%20work%20will%20mean%20for%20jobs%20skills%20and
%20wages/MGI-Jobs-Lost-Jobs-Gained-Report-December-6-2017.ashx [https://perma.cc/
XCF4-JJPC].(describing the far-reaching impact that automation will have on the global
workforce).
2. This is already a common practice in the digital economy. See, e.g., Timothy J.
Calloway, Cloud Computing, Clickwrap Agreements, and Limitation on Liability Clauses: A
Perfect Storm?, 11 Duke L. & Tech. Rev. 163, 173 (2012) (describing a proliferation of
limitation of liability clauses); Aaron T. Chiu, Note, Irrationally Bound: Terms of Use

1917

1918

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 119:1917

just allocate responsibility ex post, spreading the costs of accidents
among those developing and deploying AI, their insurers, and those they
harm. This matrix of legal rules will also deeply inﬂuence the development of AI, including the industrial organization of ﬁrms, and capital’s
and labor’s relative share of productivity and knowledge gains.
Despite these ongoing efforts to anticipate the risks of innovation,
there is grave danger that AI will become one more tool for deﬂecting
liability, like the shell companies that now obscure and absorb the blame
for much commercial malfeasance.3 The perfect technology of
irresponsible proﬁt would be a robot capable of earning funds for a ﬁrm,
while taking on the regulatory, compliance, and legal burden traditionally shouldered by the ﬁrm itself. Any proposal to grant AI “personhood”
should be considered in this light.4 Moreover, both judges and regulators
should begin to draw red lines of responsibility and attribution now,
while the technology is still nascent.5
Licenses and the Breakdown of Consumer Rationality in the Market for Social Network
Sites, 21 S. Cal. Interdisc. L.J. 167, 195 (2011) (describing the use of “disclaimers of liability” in social media network use agreements). For a practical example of how contracts are
used to deﬂect, allocate, or redirect liability in the construction industry, see generally
Patricia D. Galloway, The Art of Allocating Risk in an EPC Contract to Minimize Disputes,
Construction Law., Fall 2018, at 26 (discussing risk allocation in engineering, procurement, and construction (EPC) contracts). In the health care context, “hold harmless”
clauses can deﬂect liability from software providers. See Ross Koppel, Uses of the Legal
System that Attenuate Patient Safety, 68 DePaul L. Rev. 273, 275−76 (“The ‘hold harmless’
clause in EHR [Electronic Health Record] contracts functions to prevent vendors from
being held responsible for errors in their software even if the vendor has been repeatedly
informed of the problem and even if the problem causes harm or death to patients.”).
3. As leading AI ethics expert Joanna Bryson has explained:
Many of the problems we have in the world today come from people trying to evade the accountability of democracies and regulatory bodies.
And AI would be the ultimate shell company. If AI is human-like, the argument goes, then you can use human justice on it. But that’s just false.
You can’t even use human justice against shell companies. And there’s
no way to build AI that can actually care about avoiding corruption or
obeying the law. So it would be a complete mistake—a huge legal, moral
and political hazard—to grant rights to AI.
Fraser Myers, AI: Inhuman After All?, Spiked-Online (June 14, 2019), https://www.spikedonline.com/2019/06/14/ai-inhuman-after-all/ [https://perma.cc/A26G-YEX4] (conducting
an interview with Bryson).
4. See Joanna J. Bryson, Mihailis E. Diamantis & Thomas D. Grant, Of, for, and by
the People: The Legal Lacuna of Synthetic Persons, 25 Artiﬁcial Intelligence & L. 273, 273
(2017) (“We review the utility and history of legal ﬁctions of personhood, discussing salient precedents where such ﬁctions resulted in abuse or incoherence. We conclude that
difficulties in holding ‘electronic persons’ accountable when they violate the rights of
others outweigh the . . . moral interests that AI legal personhood might protect.”).
5. Some may argue it is already too late, thanks to the power of leading ﬁrms in the
AI space. However, there have been many recent efforts to understand and curb the worst
effects of such ﬁrms. The U.S. government has demonstrated an interest in keeping large
tech companies in line. For example, Facebook is currently facing a $5 billion ﬁne from
the FTC, a $100 million ﬁne from the SEC, and an FTC antitrust investigation. Ian Sherr,
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It may seem difficult to draw such red lines, because both journalists
and technologists can present AI as a technological development that
exceeds the control or understanding of those developing it.6 However,
the suite of statistical methods at the core of technologies now hailed as
AI has undergone evolution, not revolution.7 Large new sources of data
have enhanced its scope of application, as well as technologists’ ambitions.8 But the same types of doctrines applied to computational sensing,
prediction, and actuation in the past can also inform the near future of
AI advance.9
A company deploying AI can fail in many of the same ways as a ﬁrm
using older, less avant-garde machines or software. This Essay focuses on
one particular type of failing that can lead to harm: the use of inaccurate
or inappropriate data in training sets for machine learning. Firms using
faulty data can be required to compensate those harmed by that data
use—and should be subject to punitive damages when such faulty data
Facebook’s $5 Billion FTC Fine Is Just the Start of Its Problems, CNET (July 25, 2019),
https://www.cnet.com/news/facebooks-5-billion-ftc-ﬁne-is-just-the-start-of-its-problems/
(on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review). The Department of Justice is also reviewing tech
companies for antitrust issues. Brent Kendall, Justice Department to Open Broad, New
Antitrust Review of Big Tech Companies, Wall St. J. (July 23, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/justice-department-to-open-broad-new-antitrust-review-of-big-tech-companies11563914235 (on file with the Columbia Law Review). In response, tech companies, such as
Facebook and Google, have expanded their lobbying capacity. See Cecilia Kang & Kenneth P.
Vogel, Tech Giants Amass a Lobbying Army for an Epic Washington Battle, N.Y. Times (June 5,
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/05/us/politics/amazonapple-facebook-google-lobbying.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
6. See, e.g., Will Knight, The Dark Secret at the Heart of AI, MIT Tech. Rev. (Apr.
11, 2017), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/604087/the-dark-secret-at-the-heart-of-ai/
[https://perma.cc/V3LF-KBLD] (describing Nvidia’s experimental autonomous car as
having a “mysterious mind” unable to be understood by those designing it); David
Weinberger, Our Machines Now Have Knowledge We’ll Never Understand, WIRED (Apr.
18, 2017), https://www.wired.com/story/our-machines-now-have-knowledge-well-neverunderstand/ [https://perma.cc/FW94-L2BE] (“This infusion of alien intelligence is
bringing into question the assumptions embedded in our long Western tradition.”).
7. See, e.g., Best Practice AI, Evolution, Not Revolution: What the Bestpractice.ai Library
Tells Us About the State of AI (Part 1), Medium (Sept. 17, 2018), https://medium.com/
@bestpracticeAI/evolution-not-revolution-what-the-bestpractice-ai-library-tells-us-aboutthe-state-of-ai-part-1-f488b29add0b [https://perma.cc/VB86-544K] (describing ﬁndings
from the development of Bestpractice.ai, a library of AI use cases and case studies).
8. See generally Yoav Shoham, Raymond Perrault, Erik Brynjolfsson, Jack Clark,
James Manyika, Juan Carlos Niebles, Terah Lyons, John Etchemendy, Barbara Grosz & Zoe
Bauer, Artificial Intelligence Index: 2018 Annual Report (2018), http://cdn.aiindex.org/2018/
AI%20Index%202018%20Annual%20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/3PWE-B7Z8] (presenting
data suggesting that the number of patents and academic papers involving AI, among other
metrics, have grown rapidly).
9. Notable recent U.S. work in this vein includes Bryan Casey, Robot Ipsa Loquitur,
Geo. L.J. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 8–11), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3327673
(on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (arguing that extant forms of liability should apply
to robotics and thus many of the forms of AI that comprise the information processing of
such robotics and can address many of the problems posed by such technology).
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collection, analysis, and use is repeated or willful. Skeptics may worry that
judges and juries are ill-equipped to make determinations about appropriate data collection, analysis, and use. However, they need not act
alone—regulation of data collection, analysis, and use already exists in
other contexts.10 Such regulation not only provides guidance to industry
to help it avoid preventable accidents and other torts. It also assists
judges assessing standards of care for the deployment of emerging technologies. The interplay of federal regulation of health data with state tort
suits for breach of conﬁdentiality is instructive here: Egregious failures by
ﬁrms can not only spark tort liability but also catalyze commitments to
regulation to prevent the problems that sparked that liability, which in
turn should promote progress toward higher standards of care.11
Preserving the complementarity of tort law and regulation in this
way (rather than opting to radically diminish the role of either of these
modalities of social order, as premature preemption or deregulation
might do) is wise for several reasons. First, this hybrid model expands
opportunities for those harmed by new technologies to demand accountability.12 Second, the political economy of automation will only fairly distribute expertise and power if law and policy create ongoing incentives
for individuals to both understand and control the AI supply chain and
AI’s implementation. Judges, lawmakers, and advocates must avoid
developing legal and regulatory systems that merely deﬂect responsibility,
rather than cultivate it, lest large ﬁrms exploit well-established power imbalances to burden consumers and workers with predictable harms arising out of faulty data.
I. PROBLEMS CAUSED BY INACCURATE AND INAPPROPRIATE DATA
At its best, tort law rectiﬁes wrongs (retrospectively) and enables persons to better plan their lives (prospectively).13 This Part discusses some
classic wrongs addressed by tort law and how the rise of AI, including the
rhetoric surrounding it, may unnecessarily complicate adjudication arising out of them. To clarify some critical issues of duty and causation, litigants and courts should begin to focus on questions of inaccurate and
inappropriate data, given the importance of data to the development of
AI.
The duties of care prescribed by tort are reassuring aspects of a just
social order. If a person is injured in a car accident by a negligent driver,
courts should ensure some compensatory (and potentially punitive) damages payable by the tortfeasor (or their insurer) to ensure, as well as
10. See infra Part II.
11. See infra Part II.
12. See Mary L. Lyndon, Tort Law and Technology, 12 Yale J. on Reg. 137, 143 (1995)
(“The liability system supplements regulation.”).
13. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Nature of the Common Law 4–5, 47–48 (1st ed.
1988).
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possible, that the plaintiff is returned to the state of ﬁnancial and physical health they would have enjoyed before the accident.14 In the medical
context, malpractice law is designed to give patients reassurance that if
their physician falls below a standard of care, a penalty will be imposed
and some portion of it dedicated to the recovery of the patient.15
The machines used by drivers and doctors are also subject to forms
of tort liability: for example, in case they are negligently manufactured or
defective by design.16 These doctrines should have renewed relevance as
new technologies of diagnosis and prediction arise in both general and
specialty medical care. While AI applications promise many advances,
they also create new risks.
Consider the rise of clinical decision support software for dermatologists. As the Atlantic recently reported, “A study that tested machinelearning software in dermatology, conducted by a group of researchers
primarily out of Germany, found that ‘deep-learning convolutional neural networks,’ or CNN, detected potentially cancerous skin lesions better
than the 58 dermatologists included in the study group.”17 To the extent
such AI is continually validated, it may well become part of the standard
of care for many tasks now performed by physicians.18 However, the mere
fact that a technology is better in general does not mean that it is optimal
for all cases. In the case of facial recognition, there is a well-documented
failure of AI systems to recognize the faces of persons of color, relative to
its ability to recognize white persons’ faces.19 Many scholars have raised
similar concerns with respect to racial disparities in health care in the

14. Cf. Stuart M. Speiser, Charles F. Krause, Alfred W. Gans & Monique C. M. Leahy,
American Law of Torts § 8:1 (Mar. 2019 Update) (describing the types of redress available
to plaintiffs in a tort action).
15. Alex Stein, Toward a Theory of Medical Malpractice, 97 Iowa L. Rev. 1201, 1203,
1209 (2012) (“Under the prevalent doctrine, a doctor commits malpractice when he treats
a patient in a way that deviates from the norms established by the medical profession. The
applicable norms ﬂow from the accepted, or customary, medical practice: the ways in
which similarly situated medical practitioners treat patients.”). I introduce the topic with
examples from transport and health in part because these ﬁelds are among the most affected, or likely to be affected, by advances in AI.
16. See, e.g., Adams v. Toyota Motor Corp., 867 F.3d 903, 917 (8th Cir. 2017)
(concluding that the evidence supported a jury verdict ﬁnding the manufacturer liable for
deaths and injuries of persons involved in the collision in family members’ products liability action based on a design defect).
17. Angela Lashbrook, AI-Driven Dermatology Could Leave Dark-Skinned Patients
Behind, Atlantic (Aug. 16, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2018/08/
machine-learning-dermatology-skin-color/567619/ [https://perma.cc/NLC2-VCFS].
18. A. Michael Froomkin, Ian Kerr & Joelle Pineau, When AIs Outperform Doctors:
Confronting the Challenges of a Tort-Induced Over-Reliance on Machine Learning, 61
Ariz. L. Rev. 33, 35, 61–63 (2019).
19. See Tim Simonite, The Best Algorithms Struggle to Recognize Black Faces
Equally, WIRED (July 22, 2019), https://www.wired.com/story/best-algorithms-strugglerecognize-black-faces-equally/ [https://perma.cc/QQ4J-XBMB].
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United States.20 Physicians and computer scientists are already concerned
that skin anomaly–detecting software may fail to work for African
Americans and other minority groups in the United States as well as it
does for white patients.21
Such problems are not new. In many cases, AI is little more than a
better-marketed form of statistics, and consulting statistics has long been
a part of medical practice.22 AI is but one of many steps taken over the
past two decades to modernize medicine with a more extensive evidence
base.23 Commentators have seized on predictive analytics, big data, artiﬁcial intelligence, machine learning, and deep learning as master metaphors for optimizing system performance.24 Thus literature on each of
these areas can illuminate the path forward for identifying problematic
data in AI. Moreover, an emerging literature on the limits of AI (including lack of reproducibility, narrow validity, overblown claims, and opaque
data) should also inform legal standards.25

20. See, e.g., Dorothy Roberts, Fatal Invention: How Science, Politics, and Big
Business Re-Create Race in the Twenty-First Century 81–103 (2012). See generally Dayna
Bowen Matthew, Just Medicine: A Cure for Racial Inequality in American Health Care
(2015) (examining racial health disparities through the lens of implicit bias).
21. Adewole S. Adamson & Avery Smith, Machine Learning and Health Care
Disparities in Dermatology, 154 JAMA Dermatology 1247, 1247 (2018). A cognate problem
has arisen in genomics. See Eric Topol & Kai Fu Lee, It Takes a Planet, 37 Nature
Biotechnology 858, 859 (2019) (“AI algorithmic development and validation requires
diverse and massive datasets. There is little evidence for saturation but plenty of examples
of misleading outputs when the data inputs are limited or venue speciﬁc.”).
22. See Meredith Broussard, Artificial Unintelligence: How Computers Misunderstand
the World 32 (2018) (“Narrow AI is statistics on steroids.”).
23. See Inst. of Med. Roundtable on Evidence-Based Medicine, The Learning Healthcare
System: Workshop Summary 81 (LeighAnne Olsen, Dara Aisner & J. Michael McGinnis eds.,
2007), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/n/nap11903/pdf/ [https://perma.cc/3VYAM3S4] (“An essential component of the learning healthcare system is the capacity to continually improve approaches to gathering and evaluating evidence, taking advantage of new
tools and methods.”).
24. See, e.g., Martin Ford, Architects of Intelligence 4 (2018) (describing deep learning); Viktor Mayer-Schönberger & Kenneth Cukier, Big Data: A Revolution that Will
Transform How We Live, Work, and Think 7 (2013) (“Big data marks the beginning of a
major transformation.”); Nils J. Nilsson, The Quest for Artiﬁcial Intelligence 415 (2010)
(describing reinforcement learning).
25. Eric Topol, Deep Medicine 94 (2019) (citing concerns about “cherry-picking
results or lack of reproducibility”); danah boyd & Kate Crawford, Critical Questions for
Big Data, 15 Info., Comm. & Soc’y 662, 666–68 (2012) (describing how claims of objectivity and accuracy in big data can be misleading); Matthew Zook, Solon Barocas, danah
boyd, Kate Crawford, Emily Keller, Seeta Peña Gangadharan, Alyssa Goodman, Rachelle
Hollander, Barbara A. Koenig, Jacob Metcalf, Arvind Narayanan, Alondra Nelson & Frank
Pasquale, Editorial, Ten Simple Rules for Responsible Big Data Research, PLOS
Computational Biology, Mar. 30, 2017, at 1, 2, https://journals.plos.org/ploscompbiol/article/
file?id=10.1371/journal.pcbi.1005399&type=printable (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(identifying similar limits).
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Inaccurate Data

In 2012, law professor Sharona Hoffman and computer scientist
Andy Podgurski analyzed some common problems in then-emerging uses
of big data in healthcare.26 A great deal of the data that is now set to inform AI applications in healthcare is “generally observational, not experimental, and hence treatments and exposures are not assigned randomly.
This makes it much more difficult to ensure that causal inferences are
not distorted by systematic biases.”27 Dr. Dhruv Kullar gives a good example of the dangers of these dynamics:
In medicine, unchecked A.I. could create self-fulﬁlling
prophesies that conﬁrm our preexisting biases, especially when
used for conditions with complex trade-offs and high degrees of
uncertainty. If, for example, poorer patients do worse after organ transplantation or after receiving chemotherapy for endstage cancer, machine learning algorithms may conclude such
patients are less likely to beneﬁt from further treatment—and
recommend against it.28
There are several problems with basing treatment on socioeconomic
status. A skilled medical practitioner should be interested in why poorer
patients are doing worse, not simply that they are.29 Perhaps they have a
harder time accessing follow-up care or healthy food. The proper response in that case is not to allow poverty to reduce the priority of a patient for a transplant. Rather, it is to invest in transportation, nutritional
advice and subsidies, and other social supports that will promote a more

26. Sharona Hoffman & Andy Podgurski, Big Bad Data: Law, Public Health, and
Biomedical Databases, 41 J.L. Med. & Ethics (Spring Supp.) 56, 56 (2013).
27. Id. at 57.
28. Dhruv Khullar, Opinion, A.I. Could Worsen Health Disparities, N.Y. Times (Jan.
31, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/31/opinion/ai-bias-healthcare.html (on
ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review). As Judea Pearl and Dana MacKenzie have shown, adding accounts of causation via diagrams and other intuitive explanatory tools can help
professionals avoid such mistakes. Judea Pearl & Dana MacKenzie, The Book of Why:
The New Science of Cause and Effect 13, 39–46 (2018). This is one reason why the
European Union has adopted rules designed to promote explainable AI. See HighLevel Expert Grp. on Artificial Intelligence, European Comm’n, Ethics Guidelines for
Trustworthy AI 21–22 (2019), https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/dae/document.cfm?doc_id=
60419 [https://perma.cc/7BKM-VDHP].
29. As Hoffman and Podgurski put it:
Confounding bias is a systematic error that occurs because there exists a
common cause of the treatment/exposure variable and the outcome
variable. For example, socioeconomic factors may be confounders because low income may cause individuals to choose sub-optimal, inexpensive treatments and may also separately lead to deteriorated health because of stress or poor nutrition. A failure to account for socioeconomic
status may thus skew study results.
Hoffman & Podgurski, supra note 26, at 58 (footnote omitted).
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successful transplant.30 The main problem with the example Khullar
gives is that poverty itself is not a direct cause of the bad medical outcomes.31 Rather, there are intervening causes. AI scholars have long addressed this problem. For example, Judea Pearl and Dana MacKenzie
have insisted that a knowledge of causation—how an alleged effect generates a cause—is crucial to genuine advances in AI.32
Moreover, even if it turns out that, ceteris paribus, poorer individuals
simply do not do as well as others after transplants (surviving a shorter
period of time, or with worse comorbidities and sequelae of the procedure), that fact alone would not dictate any particular change in their
priority for organ transplantation. Society may decide that a thoroughgoing equality of access is the proper baseline for access to scarce organs,
even if such allocation rules fail to maximize quality-adjusted life years
(QALYs) or similar outcome metrics.33
Hoffman and Podgurski also point out the inadequacies of some
data, especially those captured on the ﬂy by doctors and nurses who already have more than enough to do on their shifts.34 Electronic health
record (EHR) systems may use different abbreviations: “Different systems
may use different terminology to mean the same thing or the same terminology to mean different things. For example, the abbreviation ‘MS’ can
mean ‘mitral stenosis,’ ‘multiple sclerosis,’ ‘morphine sulfate,’ or
‘magnesium sulfate.’”35 At present, the job of correcting (or throwing
out) bad data, as well as related tasks of semantic harmonization and
standardization, is often treated as secondary or menial.36 But at a certain
level of prevalence, such errors could be disastrous. Researchers must
take into account measurement biases, which “are generated by errors in
measurement and data collection resulting from faulty equipment or
software or from human error.”37 Data are always socially shaped.38 To

30. See, e.g., Mary Simmerling, Beyond Scarcity: Poverty as a Contraindication for
Organ Transplantation, 9 AMA J. Ethics 441, 442–44 (2007) (examining the ﬁnancial
burdens of post-transplant medications on the uninsured, the underinsured, and the
poor).
31. See Khullar, supra note 28.
32. Pearl & MacKenzie, supra note 28, at 1–21. See generally Judea Pearl, Causal
Inference in Statistics: An Overview, 3 Stat. Surv. 96 (2009) (discussing advances in statistical research that facilitate solving causal questions).
33. See Jon Elster, Local Justice: How Institutions Allocate Scarce Goods and
Necessary Burdens 22, 35–38 (1992) (discussing diverse normative bases for allocation
decisions).
34. Hoffman & Podgurski, supra note 26, at 57.
35. Id. at 57.
36. See Lilly Irani, Justice for “Data Janitors,” Pub. Books ( Jan. 15, 2015),
https://www.publicbooks.org/justice-for-data-janitors/ [https://perma.cc/JLY6-Y6URt]
(describing the work done by human “data janitors” to parse information that artificial
intelligence systems are not capable of differentiating).
37. Hoffman & Podgurski, supra note 26, at 58.
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avoid troubling outcomes downstream, law must incentivize health care
providers to ensure that data providers take the time and effort necessary
to address well-known biases and shortcomings of data.
In the case of automobiles, similar problems may emerge. There
may be certain individuals that a collision avoidance detection system is
less likely to identify as persons.39 Operators of autonomous cars may deploy humans as a backup, to ensure the data a car is reacting to are accurate, but even such a failsafe may itself be blameworthy if improperly applied. Human–computer interaction research has revealed that such
“backup” roles are notoriously difficult to perform well, particularly in
contexts in which attention is only required rarely and sporadically.40
B.

Inappropriate Data

While earlier versions of AI, such as expert systems, were primarily
rules based, data drives modern machine learning.41 As recent controversies over predictive policing have shown, data can be unfairly unrepresentative: If minority neighborhoods have been overpoliced in the past,
more crime will have been found in them than would be found in other
neighborhoods, ceteris paribus.42 Similarly, a ﬁrm that primarily hired

38. See Lisa Gitelman & Virginia Jackson, Introduction, in “Raw Data” Is an
Oxymoron 1, 2–6 (Lisa Gitelman ed., 2013) (arguing that data are not inherently neutral
but rather constructed and gathered in ways that are shaped by academic disciplines). See
generally Taylor M. Cruz, The Making of a Population: Challenges, Implications, and
Consequences of the Quantiﬁcation of Social Difference, 174 Soc. Sci. & Med. 79 (2017)
(discussing how the process of gathering population data imposes implicit categorical
assumptions on a heterogenous population).
39. Benjamin Wilson, Judy Hoffman & Jamie Morgenstern, Predictive Inequity in Object
Detection, arXiv (Feb. 21, 2019), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1902.11097.pdf (on ﬁle with the
Columbia Law Review) (identifying potential for object detection technology to fail to detect people with darker skin tones).
40. See, e.g., David A. Mindell, Our Robots, Ourselves 201–02 (2015) (describing the
difficulties and failures associated with human operators serving as a backup in the event
of failures by AI-driven systems such as autonomous vehicles); Madeleine Clare Elish,
Moral Crumple Zones: Cautionary Tales in Human-Robot Interaction, 5 Engaging Sci.,
Tech., & Soc’y 40, 52–55 (2019) (noting the difficulty of distributing responsibility and
agency between a self-driving car and its safety driver).
41. Pedro Domingos, The Master Algorithm 7 (2015).
42. See Angèle Cristin, Predictive Algorithms and Criminal Sentencing, in The
Decisionist Imagination: Sovereignty, Social Science, and Democracy in the 20th Century
272, 279–80 (2019) (“When predictive algorithms identify ‘hot spot’ crime zones (usually
low-income African American neighborhoods), policemen are more likely to patrol in
these neighborhoods and arrest people who will later be convicted. . . . This data will later
be entered into the algorithm, thus producing a feedback loop.”).
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male managers in the past may end up developing AI hiring mechanisms
that correlate success with gender, as opposed to actual job performance.43
Activists and authors are now exposing numerous examples of problematic data sets. For example, Caroline Criado Perez has explained how
data sets often do not adequately represent women, with very troubling
results.44 In too much medical research and pedagogy, for instance, maleness is assumed as a default. As Perez asks, “There are still vast medical
gender data gaps to be ﬁlled in, but the past twenty years have demonstrably proven that women are not just smaller men: male and female
bodies differ down to a cellular level. So why aren’t we teaching this?”45
Data may also be illegally obtained and therefore inappropriate for
use. For example, an AI hiring algorithm might incorporate breached
medical records that help it predict an applicant’s health issues. Even if
such health issues would impair the applicant’s job performance, this
data use is suspect. Thanks to trade secrecy, it may be difficult to detect
or litigate.46 Nevertheless, litigants are becoming increasingly sophisticated at unearthing the true bases of decisionmaking, and no ﬁrm
should be entitled to hide the use of illegally obtained data.47

43. See, e.g., Gideon Mann & Cathy O’Neil, Hiring Algorithms Are Not Neutral,
Harv. Bus. Rev. (Dec. 9, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/12/hiring-algorithms-are-not-neutral
[https://perma.cc/BA6V-492D] (“When humans build algorithmic screening software,
they may unintentionally determine which applicants will be selected or rejected based on
outdated information—going back to a time when there were fewer women in the workforce, for example—leading to a legally and morally unacceptable result.”); see also
Miranda Bogen & Aaron Reike, Upturn, Help Wanted: An Examination of Hiring Algorithms,
Equity, and Bias 8–9 (2018), https://www.upturn.org/static/reports/2018/hiringalgorithms/ﬁles/Upturn%20–%20Help%20Wanted%20-%20An%20Exploration%20of%
20Hiring%20Algorithms,%20Equity%20and%20Bias.pdf [https://perma.cc/5T6U-4QL4]
(describing examples of potential bias in predictive hiring tools).
44. See generally Caroline Criado Perez, Invisible Women: Data Bias in a World
Designed for Men (2019) (examining the “gender data gap”).
45. Id. at 199.
46. See Sonia K. Katyal, The Paradox of Source Code Secrecy, 104 Cornell L. Rev.
(forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 104–05) (footnote omitted), https://ssrn.com/abstract=
3409578 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (“At their core, these automated systems
often implicate central issues of due process, criminal (and civil) justice, and equal protection. Yet, because their inner workings are often protected as trade secrets, they can remain
entirely free from public scrutiny.”); Frank Pasquale, Digital Star Chamber, Aeon (Aug. 18,
2015),
https://aeon.co/essays/judge-jury-and-executioner-the-unaccountable-algorithm
[https://perma.cc/56VN-M3AT] (“Protected by trade secrecy, many algorithms remain
impenetrable to outside observers.”).
47. Concededly, the Supreme Court has offered a First Amendment imprimatur for
reuse of illegally obtained information in some contexts. See, e.g., Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532
U.S. 514, 517–18 (2001) (ﬁnding the First Amendment protects “speech that discloses the
contents of an illegally intercepted communication”). However, that defense is conditioned on a “public interest” ﬁnding, id. at 540 (Breyer, J., concurring), and secret
categorization or ranking of applicants should not qualify. See Frank Pasquale, Reforming
the Law of Reputation, 47 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 515, 529–30 (2015) (discussing the limits of
Bartnicki).
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Finally, certain inferences can become data that are extraordinarily
suspect.48 Consider, for instance, the rise of efforts to correlate persons’
facial features and voices with illness, risk, or aptitude. Machine learning
researchers have stirred controversy by claiming that our faces may reveal
our sexual orientation and intelligence.49 Using a database of prisoners’
faces, some have even developed stereotypes of criminal features, reprising long-discredited physiognomy and phrenology.50 A ﬁrm has claimed
that it can deploy facial recognition to spot pedophiles and terrorists.51
These inferences are deeply troubling. When such methods of pattern
recognition are used to classify persons, they overstep a fundamental
boundary between objective analysis and moral judgment. And when
such moral judgments are made, persons categorized by the judgements
deserve a chance to understand and contest them.
When a data set is not representative of the group it is used to classify, any results based on it should be clearly qualiﬁed. For example, a
machine learning classiﬁer may properly be said to succeed in classifying
some percentage of faces in its data set in certain ways. But it should not
be deployed as a potential classiﬁer for all persons unless and until we
have some sense of how the training set maps to the full set of persons it
ostensibly classiﬁes. As Dan McQuillan warns, machine learning often
makes powerful predictions, “prompting comparisons with science. But
rather than being universal and objective, it produces knowledge that is
irrevocably entangled with speciﬁc computational mechanisms and the
data used for training.”52 Both lawmakers and policymakers should hold
users of such data sets responsible for making predictable errors based

48. For a fuller account of the problem of troubling or inappropriate inferences, see
Sandra Wachter & Brent Mittelstadt, A Right to Reasonable Inferences: Re-Thinking Data
Protection Law in the Age of Big Data and AI, 2019 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 494, 499−505
(2019).
49. See, e.g., Sam Levin, Face-Reading AI Will Be Able to Detect Your Politics and
IQ, Professor Says, Guardian (Sept. 12, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/
2017/sep/12/artificial-intelligence-face-recognition-michal-kosinski [https://perma.cc/
X4HD-KNAK].
50. Sam Biddle, Troubling Study Says Artificial Intelligence Can Predict Who Will Be
Criminals Based on Facial Features, The Intercept (Nov. 18, 2016), https://theintercept.com/
2016/11/18/troubling-study-says-artificial-intelligence-can-predict-who-will-be-criminals-basedon-facial-features/ [https://perma.cc/X3SN-QAEU]. It was later suggested that the sources of
images used for the study may have been a key factor explaining its results. @davidjayharris,
Twitter (Mar. 7, 2019), https://twitter.com/davidjayharris/status/1103636069180993537
[https://perma.cc/AKD5-TGPT].
51. Matt McFarland, Terrorist or Pedophile? This Start-Up Says It Can Out Secrets
by Analyzing Faces, Wash. Post (May 24, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
innovations/wp/2016/05/24/terrorist-or-pedophile-this-start-up-says-it-can-out-secrets-byanalyzing-faces/ (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
52. Dan McQuillan, People’s Councils for Ethical Machine Learning, Soc. Media +
Soc’y, Apr.–June 2018, at 1, 1, https://doi.org/10.1177/2056305118768303 [https://
perma.cc/9CS7-4AAK].
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on defective data sets, particularly if they fail to disclose the limitations of
the data used.
II. COMPLEMENTARY TORT AND REGULATORY REGIMES
Tort law has evolved to handle the changing risks and affordances of
new technologies.53 However, judges alone cannot adequately respond to
the new challenges posed by AI. Objective sources of information on best
practices in data science are necessary as well. Expert agencies are
particularly well positioned to analyze and articulate emerging industry
standards, which should inform judicial determinations of standards of
care. This Part describes emerging doctrinal and regulatory approaches
that suggest data-driven duties for the developers of artiﬁcial intelligence.
This type of data stewardship serves two purposes: ex ante, to ensure that
the training data for machine learning adequately reﬂects the domain it
governs or affects, and ex post, to detect anomalies and remedy them
before they cause great harm.54 Developing and maintaining these duties
will be crucial to promoting just and humane advances in AI.
As Professors Dan Dobbs, Paul Hayden, and Ellen Bublick explain,
“A tort is conduct that constitutes a legal wrong and causes harm for
which courts will impose civil liability.”55 Negligence, vicarious liability,
strict liability, and product liability regimes all may be relevant to future
torts attributable to AI.56 In the realm of negligence, the plaintiff generally must prove that the defendant caused the plaintiff’s injury, owed a
duty of care to the plaintiff, and breached that duty.57 There are also diverse vicarious liability doctrines, each hinging on factors that include
the degree of control an entity has over the direct cause of harm.58 As
53. Donald G. Gifford, Technological Triggers to Tort Revolutions: Steam
Locomotives, Autonomous Vehicles, and Accident Compensation, 11 J. Tort L. 71, 143
(2018).
54. Cf. Kristin Madison, Health Regulators as Data Stewards, 92 N.C. L. Rev. 1605,
1607–09 (2014) (arguing that regulators, as data stewards, bear a duty to serve as both an
aggregator and editor of big health care data in order to ensure both the integrity of data
collection and informed, continuous evaluation of regulation).
55. Dan B. Dobbs, Paul T. Hayden & Ellen Bublick, Hornbook on Torts 3 (2d ed.
2016). This basic tort definition is consistent even in civil law countries around the
world. See, e.g., Principles of European Tort Law: Text and Commentary tit. 1, art. 1:101
(Eur. Grp. on Tort Law 2005) (“Basic Norm (1) A person to whom damage to another is
legally attributed is liable to compensate that damage.”); Tort Law of the People’s
Republic of China, Ministry of Commerce of China (Dec. 26, 2009),
http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/policyrelease/Businessregulations/201312/2013
1200432451.shtml [https://perma.cc/5LMK-YLDC] (“Those who infringe on civil rights
and interests shall be subject to tort liability according to this Law.”).
56. For a useful typology of torts, see the table of contents of Dobbs et al., supra note
55, at xv–xxxi.
57. Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts 269 (2000).
58. Harry Shulman, Fleming James Jr., Oscar S. Gray & Donald G. Gifford, Law of
Torts: Cases and Materials 112–30 (5th ed. 2010).
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services become more complex, one of the most promising developments in tort law is corporate liability for failure to maintain adequate
safety standards.
For example, in one of the leading cases in medical corporate liability, Thompson v. Nason Hospital, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court did not
allow the responsibility for a bad outcome to dissolve into a mist of
contractual relationships among a hospital, its staff, doctors, and the
manufacturers of devices that its doctors and staff used.59 Rather, the
Thompson court articulated a general duty of a hospital “to ensure the
patient’s safety and well-being while at the hospital.”60 The court went on
to articulate four nonexhaustive dimensions of this general duty to protect safety and well-being:
(1) a duty to use reasonable care in the maintenance of safe and
adequate facilities and equipment; (2) a duty to select and retain only competent physicians; (3) a duty to oversee all persons
who practice medicine within its walls as to patient care; and (4)
a duty to formulate, adopt and enforce adequate rules and policies to ensure quality care for the patients.61
This standard of corporate negligence has much to offer outside of
the healthcare setting. One classic theoretical foundation of health law as
a distinctive ﬁeld is the great difference between ordinary consumer markets, on the one hand, and the healthcare ﬁeld, where information asymmetries and power differentials routinely arise between patients and
healthcare providers, on the other.62 The rise of software and cyber-physical

59. 591 A.2d 703, 709 (Pa. 1991).
60. Id. at 707.
61. Id. (citations omitted).
62. As Donald Cohodes argues, medical care can be differentiated from “most other
products” in six general ways:
1. Demand for health. Medical care services are not purchased from any
desire for such services in themselves . . . [but instead are] derived from
the “demand” for good health.
2. Medical care and health. Medical care is only one determinant of health
status, and for most people at most times it is not even a very important
determinant. . . .
3. Risk. The need for medical care is unpredictable, requiring expenditures that are irregular and of uncertain magnitude.
4. Immediacy. The need for medical care is often immediate, allowing little time for shopping around and seeking advice or alternatives.
5. Lack of Information. Consumers are usually ignorant of their medical
care needs. They cannot possibly obtain the knowledge and training to
diagnose their own medical care needs . . . .
6. Uncertainty. Physicians, though highly trained and better able to diagnose needs and prescribed treatment, also are often uncertain about the
appropriate services to provide.
Donald R. Cohodes, Where You Stand Depends on Where You Sit: Musings on the
Regulation/Competition Dialogue, 7 J. Health Pol. Pol’y & L. 54, 56 (1982).
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systems portends a similar increase in complexity, power differentials,
and information asymmetry reminiscent of the highly scientiﬁc and
professionalized medical milieu.63 Doctrines and approaches developed
in the medical setting have already been proposed for other aspects of
data governance. For example, health privacy law can serve as a model
for the regulation of other data.64 Jack Balkin and Jonathan Zittrain have
proposed that a law of ﬁduciary duties, itself heavily reliant on the model
of doctors’ duties to patients, should bind large technology ﬁrms with
respect to their treatment of data collected from users.65
Thompson has been cited many times, and its factors helpfully articulate theories of liability.66 An elaboration of the corporate negligence
standard in a complex environment can illuminate the roles and responsibilities of the developers of artiﬁcial intelligence. For example, the ﬁrst
duty (to use reasonable care in the maintenance of safe facilities and
equipment) suggests a similar obligation to exercise due care in the
selection of sources of data. Thompson also reﬂects in law the conclusions
of a larger quality-improvement movement: that it is less important to
ﬁnd particular persons to blame in the case of accidents, than to identify
malfunctioning sociotechnical systems of human–computer interaction.67
The third Thompson factor, regarding adequate supervision, also
raises important questions in the context of automation developed in
corporate labs and its testing outside of controlled settings. Surveillance
techniques are widespread and well-developed.68 Such technology could

63. On the rise of software in ordinary products, see Paul Ohm & Blake Reid,
Regulating Software When Everything Has Software, 84 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1672, 1676−79
(2016); see also James Grimmelmann, Note, Regulation by Software, 114 Yale L.J. 1719,
1723–24 (2005) (giving “four patterns [that] provide a general methodology for assessing
the use of software in a given regulatory context”).
64. Frank Pasquale, The Black Box Society: The Secret Algorithms that Control
Money and Information 150–51 (2015) (discussing HIPAA standards for consent, security,
and accounting of disclosures of health data as a model for other forms of data).
65. Jack M. Balkin, Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment, 49 U.C. Davis
L. Rev. 1183, 1221–25 (2016). But see Lina Khan & David Pozen, A Skeptical View of
Information Fiduciaries, 133 Harv. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 6–8),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3341661 (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (arguing that
creating new ﬁduciary duties based on information custody is fundamentally incompatible
with existing corporate law of ﬁduciary duties and therefore impossible to implement in
the form proposed by Balkin and Zittrain).
66. As of March 15, 2019, Thompson v. Nason Hospital, 591 A.2d 703 (Pa. 1991), has
been cited in 198 cases and 273 secondary sources on Westlaw Edge.
67. Lucian L. Leape, Error in Medicine, 272 JAMA 1851, 1853 (1994) (describing the
importance of system-level analysis in attribution of blame and prevention of future
harms).
68. See, e.g., Karen E.C. Levy, The Contexts of Control: Information, Power, and TruckDriving Work, 31 Info. Soc’y 160, 160, 164 (2015) (describing how trucking firms have extensively deployed telematics to monitor truck drivers with regard to performance and
timekeeping); Steve Kolowich, Behind the Webcam’s Watchful Eye, Online Proctoring
Takes Hold, Chron. Higher Educ. (Apr. 15, 2013), https://www.chronicle.com/article/

2019]

DATA-INFORMED DUTIES

1931

help reduce bias in data collection and promote vigilance among those
tasked with overseeing the deployment of AI in sensitive settings. On the
other hand, privacy activists may raise concerns if the common law of tort
promotes excessive surveillance of workers.69 Once again, the health care
industry has been at the forefront, developing balanced frameworks for
the inclusion of surveillance technology in workplaces in which human
life is routinely at risk.70
III. REGULATORY STANDARDS FOR DATA USE AND REPORTING
If a large proportion of cases involving AI went to trial, reported
opinions would serve as a prominent source of guidance for AI vendors
and users concerned about safety and effectiveness. However, we can expect that here, as with data security, the prevalence of settlements of disputes will frustrate such evolutionary clariﬁcation of duties.71 In this vacuum, regulators should play a vital role in setting (or at least informing)

Behind-the-Webcams-Watchful/138505 [https://perma.cc/CQ5T-2C74] (describing
online proctors that watch students through a webcam to detect cheating); Natasha
Singer, Online Test-Takers Feel Anti-Cheating Software’s Uneasy Glare, N.Y. Times (Apr. 5,
2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/06/technology/online-test-takers-feel-anti-cheating-softwares-uneasy-glare.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (describing software
developed to detect cheating during online and computer exam taking).
69. See, e.g., Lewis Maltby, Can They Do That?: Retaking Our Fundamental Rights in
the Workplace 16–17 (2009) (describing an example of intrusive surveillance of workers);
Ifeoma Ajunwa, Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, Limitless Worker Surveillance, 105 Calif.
L. Rev. 735, 735–36, 772–73 (2017) (describing the trend of increased worker surveillance
and exploring possible remedies to protect worker privacy).
70. See generally Clara Berridge, Jodi Halpern & Karen Levy, Cameras on Beds: The
Ethics of Surveillance in Nursing Home Rooms, 10 AJOB Empirical Bioethics 55 (2019)
(examining survey data on the use of “family-provided cameras” in nursing homes and
their legal and ethical implications); Karen Levy, Lauren Kilgour & Clara Berridge,
Regulating Privacy in Public/Private Space: The Case of Nursing Home Monitoring Laws,
26 Elder L.J. 323, 326–27 (2019) (comparing “state laws and regulations governing resident-room cameras in nursing homes . . . focus[ing] on how such rules approach and
balance the privacy concerns of the multiple relations involved in such contexts, and how
legal protections do—and do not—address relationship-speciﬁc interests”).
71. See William McGeveran, The Duty of Data Security, 103 Minn. L. Rev. 1135, 1144
(2019) (“There are numerous lawsuits about data security, which raise claims under tort,
contract, or consumer protection law, among other theories. Courts considering these
cases offer hardly any insight into the content of the duty of data security, however, because
they almost never reach the merits.” (footnote omitted)); cf. Owen M. Fiss, Against
Settlement, 93 Yale L.J. 1073, 1075, 1078–85 (1984) (complaining of the problems caused
by this avoidance). Instead, in the data security context, the Federal Trade Commission
has taken the lead. See Woodrow Hartzog and Daniel J. Solove, The FTC and the New
Common Law of Privacy, 114 Colum. L. Rev. 583, 585–86 (2014) (“Despite over ﬁfteen
years of FTC enforcement, there are hardly any judicial decisions to show for it. The cases
have nearly all resulted in settlement agreements. . . . Thus, in practice, FTC privacy
jurisprudence has become the broadest and most inﬂuential regulating force on information privacy in the United States . . . .”).
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standards.72 Though the current Congress is unlikely to establish a new
agency, existing statutory authorities already grant extant agencies the
power to gather, analyze, and disseminate data that would aid courts’
assessments of the proper standard of care in disputes related to AI-informed and AI-performed services.73 Some of these agencies have also
established standards that have informed tort cases in data-related ﬁelds,
such as privacy law.74
A.

Ensuring the Integrity of Inputs

One purpose of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act’s (HIPAA) security requirements is to protect data from hackers or
other corrupting inﬂuences.75 A logical extension of this duty is for agencies to set standards for AI vendors and users to verify the quality and
accuracy of the data they use.76 These standards may start at an elementary level. For example, HIPAA best practices dictate that a covered entity
both record any source of data it receives and record its transfer of data
to other covered entities or business associates.77 Those recipients of data
must in turn do the same.78 This creates a set of links that makes it easier
to trace and then minimize the impact of inaccurate, unrepresentative,
72. For a general account of the government role in promoting standardized data,
see generally Michal S. Gal & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Data Standardization, 94 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
(forthcoming 2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3326377 (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law
Review).
73. See Andrew F. Popper, Gwendolyn M. McKee, Anthony E. Varona, Philip J.
Harter, Mark C. Niles & Frank Pasquale, Administrative Law: A Contemporary Approach
1067–134 (3d ed. 2016) (describing the power, and the limits of such power, of U.S. agencies to demand information).
74. See infra sections III.A–.B.
75. See Frank Pasquale, Redescribing Health Privacy: The Importance of
Information Policy, 14 Hous. J. Health L. & Pol’y 95, 105–09 (2014) (describing the range
of security measures prescribed by HIPAA).
76. See, e.g., Meredith Whittaker, Kate Crawford, Roel Dobbe, Genevieve Fried,
Elizabeth Kaziunas, Varoon Mathur, Sarah Myers West, Rashida Richardson, Jason
Schultz & Oscar Schwartz, AI Now Report 2018, at 4–7 (2018), https://ainowinstitute.org/
AI_Now_2018_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/4J3T-TCTR] (discussing the importance of
sectoral regulation); cf. Frank Pasquale, Private Certifiers and Deputies in American Health
Care, 92 N.C. L. Rev. 1661, 1668−69, 1671−73, 1692 (2014) (describing a broad array of public and private actors that have cooperated in highly technical areas to promote data quality
and interoperability in the health care industry).
77. Bill Becker, HIPAA Compliance Best Practices: Questions and Answers to Improve
Security and Avoid Penalties, HIPAA J. (May 16, 2017), https://www.hipaajournal.com/hipaacompliance-best-practices-8809/ [https://perma.cc/GZZ5-HM4L]; Office for Civil Rights, How
Are Covered Entities Expected to Determine What Is the Minimum Necessary Information that
Can Be Used, Disclosed, or Requested for a Particular Purpose?, HHS: Health Info. Privacy
(Dec. 19, 2002), https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/faq/207/how-are-covered-entities-to-determine-what-is-minimum-necessary/index.html
[https://perma.cc/R788-UZRW]
(last updated Mar. 14, 2006).
78. See Becker, supra note 77 (discussing best practices for improving data security);
Office for Civil Rights, supra note 77 (setting out requirements for minimum data sharing).
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or otherwise compromised data.79 Similar standards should inform the
stewardship of data used for machine learning and AI. Federal standards
for data protection may, in turn, become part of the standard of care for
torts like breach of medical conﬁdentiality.80
For a concrete example of why such practices matter, consider how
voice recognition software may be more or less accurate with respect to
persons with different voices or accents.81 As of 2020, databases may have
a certain level of inclusiveness;82 by 2025, this is likely to have improved
markedly.83 An AI vendor using the 2020 database in 2025 for missioncritical applications may rightly be faulted for failing to update in light of
new knowledge about the limitations of the database. But we would not
even know where to look for such a problem if the source of the ﬁrm’s
data was not recorded adequately.84

79. See Woodrow Hartzog, Chain Link Conﬁdentiality, 46 Ga. L. Rev. 657, 677 (2012)
(“The HIPAA Privacy Rules provide that, although only covered entities such as healthcare
providers are bound to conﬁdentiality, these entities may not disclose information to their
business associates without executing a written contract that places the business associate
under the same conﬁdentiality requirements as the healthcare providers.”). These protections have been strengthened even further by the Health Information Technology for
Economic and Clinical Health Act (HITECH) (and the HIPAA Omnibus Rule of 2013),
which impose statutory and regulatory duties on business associates and even their downstream contractors. See Frank Pasquale & Tara Adams Ragone, Protecting Health Privacy
in an Era of Big Data Processing and Cloud Computing, 17 Stan. Tech. L. Rev. 595, 609–15
(2014) (describing these duties).
80. See Barry R. Furrow, Thomas L. Greaney, Sandra H. Johnson, Timothy Stoltzfus
Jost, Robert L. Schwartz, Brietta R. Clark, Erin C. Fuse Brown, Robert Gatter, Jaime S. King
& Elizabeth Pendo, Health Law: Cases, Materials and Problems 201 (8th ed. 2018) (noting
that courts have held that “despite the absence of a private right of action under HIPAA, it
can inform the applicable standard of care in common law tort cases”); see also Bonney v.
Stephens Mem’l Hosp., 17 A.3d 123, 128 (Me. 2011) (“HIPAA standards, like state laws
and professional codes of conduct, may be admissible to establish the standard of care
associated with a state tort claim . . . .”); Acosta v. Byrum, 638 S.E.2d 246, 253 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2006) (describing HIPAA “providing evidence of the duty of care owed . . . with regards to the privacy of plaintiff’s medical records”). But see Young v. Carran, 289 S.W.3d
586 (Ky. Ct. App. 2008) (declining to adopt a negligence per se standard); Sheldon v.
Kettering Health Network, 40 N.E.3d 661, 664 (Ohio Ct. App. 2015) (same).
81. See Sonia Paul, Voice Is the Next Big Platform, Unless You Have an Accent,
WIRED (Mar. 20, 2017), https://www.wired.com/2017/03/voice-is-the-next-big-platformunless-you-have-an-accent/ [https://perma.cc/78TL-PSC9] (reporting on the difficulties
associated with creating software that recognizes different accents).
82. See id. (reporting tech companies’ efforts to improve the inclusiveness of their
accent data); Kyle Wiggers, These Companies Are Shrinking the Voice Recognition
‘Accent Gap,’ Venture Beat (Aug. 11, 2018), https://venturebeat.com/2018/08/11/usingai-and-big-data-to-address-the-accent-gap-in-voice-recognition-systems/ [https://perma.cc/
F96Z-9FH4] (same).
83. See Paul, supra note 81; Wiggers, supra note 82.
84. This is not a mere hypothetical; I recently had to take to Twitter to learn where
the voices for a Google Assistant feature (Duplex) came from. The source was not clearly
labeled on the corporate website trumpeting the feature.
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Such standards will be resisted. AI vendors will likely push for another approach, simply disclosing potential problems with their data in
advance in disclaimers.85 Perhaps it is the responsibility of the person using the AI, rather than the vendor of AI, to correct for error-prone datasets. However, courts may also ﬁnd ample precedent for holding vendors
responsible. For example, in lawsuits over food poisoning, consumers’
“reasonable expectation” of purity and appropriateness of ingredients
has been recognized.86
Some AI-driven devices may also need to be subjected to the certiﬁcation and testing now applied (albeit minimally) to electronic health
records.87 Thanks to the HITECH Act of 2009, the Department of Health
and Human Services must assure that EHRs meet basic functionality requirements.88 Failures of EHR vendors to comply with federal health
standards have already led to litigation.89 Given the False Claims Act’s
85. For entertaining examples of the rhetoric one can expect, see Chris Jay
Hoofnagle, Denialists’ Deck of Cards: An Illustrated Taxonomy of Rhetoric Used to
Frustrate Consumer Protection Efforts (Feb. 9, 2007) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.
com/abstract=962462 (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (illustrating “a taxonomy of
arguments used in denialism” by using “a deck of playing cards to make it more
interesting and to emphasize that denialists are engaged in a predictable game to ‘do little
and delay.’”).
86. See Gail Kachadurian McCallion, Note, From the Source to the Mouth: What Can
You Reasonably Expect to Find in Your Food?, 5 Fordham Envtl. L.J. 189, 212 (1993)
(“The reasonable expectation test asserts that regardless of whether a substance in a food
product is natural to an ingredient, liability will lie for injuries caused by the substance
where the consumer of the product would not have reasonably expected to ﬁnd the substance in the product.”); see also Richard E. Kaye, Foreign Substance in Food or Beverage,
124 Am. Jur. Proof Facts 3d 91, § 2 (2018) (citing Restatement (Third) of Torts: Prod.
Liab. § 7 (Am. Law Inst. 1998)).
87. See, e.g., ONC—Authorized Testing Laboratories (ONC-ATLs), HealthIT.gov
(Sept. 24, 2018), https://www.healthit.gov/node/95011 [https://perma.cc/63XV-7A97]
(listing the ﬁve Authorized Testing Laboratories “accredited by NVLAP and authorized by
ONC to test Health IT Modules under the ONC Health IT Certiﬁcation Program”).
88. Health Information Technology Standards, 45 C.F.R. §§ 170.202–170.210 (2019)
(providing a detailed set of standards for the use and storage of electronic health information including, for example, encryption and hashing algorithm requirements).
89. See, e.g., Complaint at 1–4, United States ex rel. Delaney v. eClinicalWorks, No.
2:15-CV-00095-WKS (D. Vt. May 1, 2015) (alleging that the defendant failed to comply with
federal requirements and that it misrepresented information and failed to disclose flaws in its
EHR system in violation of the False Claims Act). The defendant later settled the claim for
$155 million. See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Electronic Health Records Vendor to Pay
155 Million to Settle False Claims Act Allegations (May 31, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/
opa/pr/electronic-health-records-vendor-pay-155-million-settle-false-claims-act-allegations
[https://perma.cc/59B3-6M5E]; see also Jessica Davis, eClinicalWorks Sued for Nearly
$1 Billion for Inaccurate Medical Records, Healthcare IT News (Nov. 17, 2017), https://www.
healthcareitnews.com/news/eclinicalworks-sued-nearly-1-billion-inaccurate-medical-records
[https://perma.cc/3FFF-NNQV] (“EHR vendor eClinicalWorks has been hit with a classaction lawsuit that alleges . . . that millions of patients have compromised patient records,
as eClinicalWorks’ software didn’t meet meaningful use and certification requirements
laid out by the Office of the National Coordinator.”); Heather Landi, $1 Billion Class
Action Lawsuit Filed Against eClinicalWorks, Healthcare Innovation (Nov. 20, 2017),
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(FCA) role in assuring that healthcare providers are treating patients
with valid and effective forms of care, this form of liability should be a
bellwether speciﬁcally for AI vendors contracting with governmental
authorities. Consumer protection authorities should also take note.
B.

Ensuring the Transparency of Outputs

Health regulators have long considered data stewardship a critical
role under their statutory mandate.90 When the federal government began funding EHRs in earnest in 2011, it not only demanded certain basic
recordkeeping but also set providers on an ambitious path toward
“meaningful use” of information technology—including potentially AIdriven tools like clinical decision support.91 In 2015, Congress promoted
interoperability in the Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act
(MACRA).92 This drive for interoperability continues to this day, as the
Office for the National Coordinator of Health Information Technology
and the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services have recently announced rulemakings designed to help promote data liquidity.93
One key rationale for interoperability is supporting the massive
disclosure and reporting requirements mandated pursuant to healthcare
ﬁnance reforms (covering Advanced Payment Models (APMs) such as
Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs), as well as readmissions penalties and bundled payments).94 It may be very difficult for networks like
https://www.hcinnovationgroup.com/clinical-it/news/13029475/1-billion-class-actionlawsuit-filed-against-eclinicalworks [https://perma.cc/EKR7-KPKJ] (“The class action
lawsuit alleges ECW falsely represented to its certifying bodies that its software complied with
the requirements for certification and the payment of incentives under the MU program,
and therefore, caused its users to falsely attest to using a certified EHR technology.”).
90. See generally Madison, supra note 54, at 1607–28 (discussing ways the federal
government has taken on “the responsibility for protecting the integrity and conﬁdentiality of data” in the health care sector).
91. Frank Pasquale, Grand Bargains for Big Data: The Emerging Law of Health
Information, 72 Md. L. Rev. 682, 710−11 (2013) (explaining how the law promotes patient
health).
92. Pub. L. No. 114-10, § 106(b), 129 Stat. 87, 138–40 (2015) (codiﬁed at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395w-4 (2018)) (“The term ‘interoperability’ means the ability of two or more health
information systems or components to exchange clinical and other information . . . to
provide access to longitudinal information for health care providers in order to facilitate
coordinated care and improved patient outcomes.”).
93. Interoperability and Patient Access for Medicare Advantage Organization and
Medicaid Managed Care Plans, State Medicaid Agencies, CHIP Agencies and CHIP Managed
Care Entities, Issuers of Qualified Health Plans in the Federally-Facilitated Exchanges and
Health Care Providers, 84 Fed. Reg. 7610 (proposed Mar. 4, 2019); 21st Century Cares Act:
Interoperability, Information Blocking, and the ONC Health IT Certification Program, 84
Fed. Reg. 7424 (proposed Mar. 4, 2019).
94. See, e.g., 2019 Program Requirements Medicare, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid
Servs., https://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Legislation/EHRIncentivePrograms/
2019ProgramRequirementsMedicare.html [https://perma.cc/GB7L-PK34] (last modified
May 8, 2019) (describing reporting requirements for Medicare programs to comply with
Promoting Interoperability measures); MIPS Overview, Quality Payment Program, Ctrs. for
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ACOs to accurately report on quality standards without a common infrastructure of EHRs that can aggregate data on key performance indicators
and benchmarks.95 A common indicator of nosocomial infection, for instance, may be critical to ensuring the integrity of performance assessment.
AI applications are already playing a role in promoting health-related interventions and should be subject to similar performance assessments. For example, as Natasha Singer has reported, Facebook has deployed an algorithm to ﬂag users that may be so suicidal that police
should be called by Facebook employees to intervene.96 Mason Marks has
documented numerous other examples of “social suicide prediction”
programs, which use machine learning to generate risk scores for individuals.97 There are long-term risks to privacy and autonomy that such
scores could create—for example, if unregulated and shared beyond
their source, they may affect the marketing a person experiences, or even
job or insurance opportunities.98
They also raise important concerns about immediate risks to safety
caused by false positives. What are the stigmatic concerns raised by being
falsely accused of extreme suicidality, or of a suicide attempt? What do
ﬁrst responders think of the interventions they have been prompted to
carry out? Ensuring that there are standard ways of reporting positive
and negative interventions here could help policymakers better determine which AI to fund in this critical area. It could also nip in the bud
problematic interventions, like the Samaritans’ Radar App, which shut

Medicare & Medicaid Servs., https://qpp.cms.gov/mips/overview [https://perma.cc/BWX7YNEM] (last visited June 28, 2019) (describing the Merit-based Incentive Payment
System (MIPS) and four areas of reporting: “Quality, Improvement Activities,
Promoting Interoperability (formerly Advancing Care Information), and Cost”);
Promoting Interoperability (PI), Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., https://www.
cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Legislation/EHRIncentivePrograms/index.html?
redirect=/EHRincentiveprograms [https://perma.cc/CH85-HQ5Q] (last modified Aug. 14,
2019) (describing CMS’ Promoting Interoperability program).
95. On the role of such indicators and benchmarks in AI-driven medical practice, see
Frank Pasquale, Professional Judgment in an Era of Artiﬁcial Intelligence and Machine
Learning, 46 boundary 2, at 73, 85 (2019) (exploring the role that metrics play in ACO
performance assessments and compensation under the Affordable Care Act).
96. Natasha Singer, In Screening for Suicide Risk, Facebook Takes on Tricky Public
Health Role, N.Y. Times (Dec. 31, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/31/technology/
facebook-suicide-screening-algorithm.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
97. See generally Mason Marks, Artiﬁcial Intelligence Based Suicide Prediction, Yale
J. Health Pol’y L. & Ethics (forthcoming), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3324874 (on ﬁle
with the Columbia Law Review) (discussing the contours and unforeseen consequences of
programs initiated by companies such Facebook, Crisis Text Line, and Operation Zero
that “collect [consumers’] digital traces and analyze them with AI to infer [consumers’]
health information”).
98. Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process for
Automated Predictions, 89 Wash. L. Rev. 1, 4 (2014) (describing spread of scoring
technologies).
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down its simple program for automated detection of suicidality after public complaints.99
CONCLUSION
Futurists envision AI programs that effectively act of their own accord, without direction or control by their developers (or any other person). Such entities could be quite dangerous.100 However, advocates for
such AI believe that law should effectively step out of the way of its
development. How, the question goes, can the creators or owners of such
general-purpose technology anticipate all the potential legal problems
their AI might generate or encounter? No one wants to hold Microsoft
responsible for ransom notes written with MSWord—it is a blank slate.
Nor are parents responsible for the crimes of their children—they are
independent entities.
Leading developers of AI, at present, beneﬁt from both the “blank
slate” and “independent entity” intuitions of nonresponsibility for their
creations. But neither should immunize such ﬁrms, given a decade of
research on algorithmic accountability. As Jack Balkin has observed, we
all now know that algorithms can “(a) construct identity and reputation
through (b) classiﬁcation and risk assessment, creating the opportunity
for (c) discrimination, normalization, and manipulation, without (d)
adequate transparency, accountability, monitoring, or due process.”101
Moreover, we are well aware of their ability to malfunction, dating back at
least to the Therac-25 debacle of the 1980s.102 These factors all counsel in
favor of discouraging the development of any AI whose actions are not
directly attributable to a person or persons that can be held responsible
for them.103
99. Jamie Orme, Samaritans Pulls ‘Suicide Watch’ Radar App over Privacy Concerns,
Guardian (Nov. 7, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/society/2014/nov/07/samaritansradar-app-suicide-watch-privacy-twitter-users [https://perma.cc/342U-99KP].
100. See, e.g., Lynn M. Lopucki, Algorithmic Entities, 95 Wash. U. L. Rev. 887, 951
(2018) (“[Algorithmic entities] constitute a threat to humanity because the only limits on
their conduct are the limits the least restrictive human creator imposes.”).
101. Jack M. Balkin, 2016 Sidley Austin Distinguished Lecture on Big Data Law and
Policy: The Three Laws of Robotics in the Age of Big Data, 78 Ohio St. L.J. 1217, 1239
(2017). Algorithmic information processing is in effect the “brain” of robotics and AI
agents. See generally Domingos, supra note 41, at 93–119.
102. See generally Edmond W. Israelski & William H. Muto, Human Factors Risk
Management as a Way to Improve Medical Device Safety: A Case Study of the Therac 25
Radiation Therapy System, 30 Joint Commission J. Quality & Safety 689 (2004); Nancy G.
Leveson & Clark S. Turner, An Investigation of the Therac-25 Accidents, Computer, July
1993, at 18, 18 (presenting an accident investigation of overdoses caused by the Therac-25
radiation therapy machine).
103. Frank Pasquale, Toward a Fourth Law of Robotics: Preserving Attribution,
Responsibility, and Explainability in an Algorithmic Society, 78 Ohio St. L.J. 1243, 1252−55
(2017) (arguing that very high levels of autonomy should be illegal if any harm is foreseeable, given the problems of attribution they can give rise to).
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However appealing dreams of artiﬁcial general intelligence may be,
the dominant version of AI now prevalent in commerce and government
is only a few steps removed from algorithmic systems we are all now familiar with. For example, “AI hiring” based on voice parsing is not a substitute for a Director of Human Resources.104 Nor is it an all-purpose assessment of character. Rather, it is a method of translating data (a voice) into
an output (an assessment of likely success at a job) based on computational analysis of how past employees with similar voices have fared at
the job. True, the concept of “similarity” here may have far more dimensions than a simple linear relationship; contemporary machine learning
is premised on advances in computational power that not only allow various, granular hypotheses to be tested, but also combine potentially relevant variables in myriad ways.105 However, the collection, analysis, and use
of data is foundational to the process, and presents several opportunities
for imposing duties on AI developers, given possibly inaccurate or
inappropriate data.
Advocates for legal technology (including legaltech, regtech, and
ﬁntech) have promoted a “duty of technological competence” for lawyers.106 In many cases, an attorney cannot properly serve a client without
knowing how to use certain databases or search engines. Nor can a lawyer competently advise a modern business on a topic like document
retention without a clear sense of how computers store data. Rules of

104. Stephen Buranyi, How to Persuade a Robot that You Should Get the Job,
Guardian (Mar. 3, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/mar/04/robotsscreen-candidates-for-jobs-artificial-intelligence [https://perma.cc/5GCW-JN5E]. For further
descriptions of such analytics, see Matthew T. Bodie, Miriam A. Cherry, Marcia L. McCormick
& Jintong Tang, The Law and Policy of People Analytics, 88 U. Colo. L. Rev. 961, 963,
1032−38 (2017).
105. See The Royal Soc’y, Machine Learning: The Power and Promise of Computers that
Learn by Example 19–20 (2017), https://royalsociety.org/~/media/policy/projects/machinelearning/publications/machine-learning-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/YUE9-87MZ].
106. See, e.g., Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct 1.1 cmt. 8 (Am. Bar Ass’n 2018) (including
the duty to “maintain the requisite knowledge and skill . . . including [keeping up-to-date on]
the benefits and risks associated with relevant technology”); see also Anthony E. Davis & Steven
M. Puiszis, An Update on Lawyers’ Duty of Technological Competence: Part 1, N.Y. L.J. (Mar. 1,
2019),
https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2019/03/01/an-update-on-lawyers-duty-oftechnological-competence-part-1/ [https://perma.cc/3XU5-6P4P] [hereinafter Davis &
Puiszis, Update Part 1] (arguing that it is necessary for today’s lawyers to maintain data security
and become familiar with the technology used to run a law firm and practice law); Anthony E.
Davis & Steven M. Puiszis, An Update on Lawyers’ Duty of Technological Competence: Part 2,
N.Y. L.J. (May 3, 2019), https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2019/05/03/an-update-onlawyers-duty-of-technological-competence-part-2/ [https://perma.cc/P7Z5-BWX4] [hereinafter Davis & Puiszis, Update Part 2] (using social media, electronic discovery, client technology,
and technology to present information in court).
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professional responsibility, as well as tort doctrines of legal malpractice,107
enforce a duty of technological competence on many attorneys.108
In numerous ﬁelds, there is a parallel duty for technology providers
to have some basic understanding of the law as they serve their clients. A
video hosting service in the United States, for example, needs to understand the fundamentals of copyright law.109 Firms developing electronic
health record software unaware of the requirements of HIPAA110 (and
many other laws governing health privacy) cannot serve their clients well.
In these cases, and many others, the onus is not simply on the buyer of
the technology to vet what it is buying or leasing. Rather, principles of
secondary liability effectively impose what might be called a duty of legal
competence—of a basic understanding of what law requires—on
technologists.111 Some popular understandings of artiﬁcial intelligence
pose a threat to the duty of legal competence by mystifying the bases of
decisions. However, law and policy can require basic safeguards be taken
in its development, can standardize public reporting on its effectiveness
and safety, and can impose liability on the developers of unsafe, biased,
or otherwise defective AI.
The promise of AI law and policy is to ensure that the owners and
developers of algorithms are more accountable to the public.112 Without
imposing legal duties on the developers of AI, there is little chance of
ensuring accountable technological development in this ﬁeld. By focusing on data, the fundamental input for AI, both judges and policymakers
can channel the development of AI to respect, rather than evade, core
legal values.

107. See, e.g., James v. Nat’l Fin. LLC, No. 8931-VCL, 2014 WL 6845560, at *12 (Del.
Ch. Dec. 5, 2014) (citing Del. Rules of Prof’l Conduct 1.1 cmt. 8).
108. See Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 1.1 cmt. 8; Katherine Medianik, Note,
Artiﬁcially Intelligent Lawyers: Updating the Model Rules of Professional Conduct in
Accordance with the New Technological Era, 39 Cardozo L. Rev. 1497, 1512, 1514−16
(2018); Davis & Puiszis, Update Part 1, supra note 106; Davis & Puiszis, Update Part 2,
supra note 106.
109. For an example of such copyright law, see Digital Millennium Copyright Act of
1998, 17 U.S.C. §§ 1202–1332 (2012).
110. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191,
110 Stat. 1936 (codiﬁed in scattered sections of 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.).
111. In the case of HIPAA, the secondary liability would be imposed on the vendor via
a business associate agreement. See Pasquale & Adams Ragone, supra note 79, at 609–15.
112. See Robyn Caplan, Joan Donovan, Lauren Hanson, & Jeanna Mathews, Algorithmic
Accountability: A Primer 10 (2018), https://datasociety.net/output/algorithmic-accountabilitya-primer/ [https://perma.cc/UTW2-62M9] (“Algorithmic accountability ultimately refers
to the assignment of responsibility for how an algorithm is created and its impact on society; if harm occurs, accountable systems include a mechanism for redress.”). Edward
Rubin has deﬁned accountability as “the ability of one actor to demand an explanation or
justiﬁcation of another actor for its actions, and to reward or punish the second actor on
the basis of its performance or its explanation.” Edward Rubin, The Myth of Accountability
and the Anti-Administrative Impulse, 103 Mich. L. Rev. 2073, 2073 (2005).
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